I would not argue that we are now confronted with something close to a « global crisis ». Rather, it would be more accurate to say that the U.S. has fundamentally altered its assessment of its own capabilities and its scope of action; the White House now considers itself entitled to do whatever it wishes, if it feels it cannot be stopped by sheer force. Yes, this constitutes a strikingly new reality; however, the greater part of the world remains uninvolved in ongoing war (and will not become its part in the future), so it is hardly appropriate to speak of a « global crisis ».
Russia may be called a clear beneficiary of the current events for two reasons.
On the one hand, through its actions, the U.S. is effectively legitimizing the war in Ukraine, as it validates the possibility of discarding all established rules (as early as 2014, the Kremlin argued that either a «new world order» is established on its own terms, or the «game without rules» will dominate). That latter scenario has now commenced—an environment that Putin views both favourable for himself, and ruinous for Europe. Consequently, Moscow is satisfied with the unfolding situation; the extermination of the leadership of a friendly nation is regarded as a mere trifle.
On the other hand, Russia benefits from shifts in the oil market—where prices have surged—as well as from the lifting of sanctions, enabling it to export resources more effectively. Should this price level persist for another three to four months, the Russian budget will be executed in accordance with the parameters approved in 2025 (precisely as I had projected in my 2026 forecast, published last December). The economic impact of the war in Iran on Russia is expected to be both enduring and positive; even after the conflict concludes, sanctions are quite unlikely to be reinstated, while demand for Russian oil may remain at elevated level for months.
At the same time, however, one must also consider another serious consequence of this war. U.S. strikes against Iran have intensified Putin’s phobias (and those who believe that internet restrictions in Russia and the tightening of police control are direct consequences of these events are correct). Consequently, the easing of the budgetary constraints will most likely fuel increased war efforts and expansion of the special services—a course of action that, in the long run, risks precipitating a deeper economic crisis and fuel public discontent. Thus, despite obvious short-term benefits for Russia, the war in the Persian Gulf carries numerous potentially negative consequences, the full scale of which remains difficult to assess.