An introduction to political forecasting

Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich

Most people are not aware of the fact that they make hundreds of forecasts (or predictions) every day. Every decision is linked to a forecast about its effects.

The bad news is that most professional forecasts score no better than coin tosses. Partly, it may be simply impossible to make a meaningful forecast (e.g., stock market prices). Partly, forecasters have the incentive to play down the uncertainty (“noise”) that goes with every forecast. Nevertheless, if one allows for sufficient error margins, one may significantly increase the success rate.

This introductory course will focus on ways and means to be less wrong and to develop a sense for the possibilities and limits of forecasting. Bayesian reasoning is proposed as a major approach, because it allows for alternative beliefs and hypotheses and maps the process of forecasting we use in our daily lives.

The Roots of the Russian-Ukrainian War

Dr. Taras KUZIO

The four lectures will analyse four roots of Russia's 2014 invasion and 2022 full-scale invasions of Ukraine.

These four roots include the rise of imperial nationalism in state and religious institutions in Putin's Russia from the mid-2000s; nostalgia for the Tsarist past and Soviet Union, including promotion of cults of Joseph Stalin and the Great Patriotic War; anti-Western xenophobia and view of Ukraine as an artificial US puppet state; and divergence from 1991-2013 of Russian and Ukrainian political systems, memory politics, and foreign policy, the speed of which increased after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and first Russian military aggression.

Russia’s unreadiness to the conflict and the “first adjustment”

Dr. Vladislav INOZEMTSEV

This section will concentrate around pre-war policies, which were rather ignorant about the high degree of Russian economy’s dependency from “unfriendly” nations (in terms of keeping currency reserves in Europe, being linked to European commodities markets and remaining highly dependent on Western technologies). This all had resulted in a serious losses inflicted by the Western sanctions which took around half a year (or, better to say, up to ten months, if Russia’s “partial mobilization” is counted as well) to be countered. I would argue that crucial here are the following points: the Russian economy had successfully coped with the sanctions because it has been mostly private and market-driven (which means that the reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s, inspired by Western experts, were successful enough); the commodity foundations of the Russian economy appeared to be its rather strong than a weak feature; and that the Kremlin effectively saved the Russian economy by not increasing the government regulations in 2022 but by easing most of them. What also seems to be extremely important is that the anti-Russia sanctions inflicted bigger losses for the countries that imposed them than for Russia inself – and this should become a concern for future planning of Western sanctions against any other countries). I will also assess individual and sectoral sanctions’ role, the response by Russia’s “technocratic” bureaucrats, elaboration of alternative supply chains and new growth opportunities.
I will conclude that by the end of the first year of the war the Russian economy had adopted itself to the growing autarky and started to expand being driven by an increase in military spending and weaponry production. I call this “the first adjustment” – a response to the initial blow and the formation of the system capable to survive the disruption of economic ties with the West and refurbishment of the Russian foreign trade.

“Military Keynesianism” and the success-driven dizziness

Dr. Vladislav INOZEMTSEV

The main aim of the second lecture will be an assessment of Russia’s economic developments between early 2023 and the second half of 2024 – during the time when the authorities doubled the military budget; created their “deathonomics” allowing to turn the increase of the number of servicemen and their subsequent “utilization” into a kind of business beneficial for the national economy; established much-needed alternative paralegal trade vehicles (i.e. the shadow tanker fleet) and clearing instruments (from the use of cryptocurrencies to “havalah” and barter schemes); successfully legalized much of the “grey” economy through easing the regulation of individual entrepreneurship and self-employment; and, last but not least, introduced a 2025 tax hike. I would add here that the basic foundation for the “military boom” has been not an increase of budget financing as such, but rather the rise of the employee compensation’s share in the Russian GDP (and there is little difference whether it originated from the increase of servicemen’s salaries, industrial workers’ or self-employed’s revenues). Prior to 2019 the share of wages and other types of labour compensation has been decreasing in Russia, falling from almost 50 percent to less than 38 percent, while the share of profits and other entrepreneurial revenues approached 20 percent (in the U.S., I would say, these numbers stay at 66 and 9 percent, correspondingly). The war has overturned this trend, thus providing a foundation for a broad economic recovery. I will also focus on different strategies the authorities had used for stimulating the economy as well as on Russia’s re-orientation from the West to China and some new trends in Russia’s regional development. Besides that, I will outline crucial negative features caused by economic “overheating” such as growing inflation, interest rates increases, and labour shortage. But the Kremlin, it seems, becomes confident in the “war economy”.

The Second adjustment and some possible perspectives

Dr. Vladislav INOZEMTSEV

The third lecture focuses on the economic conditions as of early 2025. Today one can state that the Russian economy is definitely overheated, and the authorities should care about how it will develop further either in the case of the intensification of the war, or in case both sides would opt for a kind of ceasefire or armistice. As for now, the gap between the incomes of those engaged in military service or working for the military industry, on the one hand, and all of the rest, on the other, looks excessive; the economy lacks a mechanism of balancing the interests of producers and consumers; the failures in import substitution aggravate the dependency on industrial imports. The government has started to cut infrastructural and social spending, even in nominal terms, meaning their decrease in real terms may become clearly visible. I would try to argue that by 2026 the overall increase of the budget outlays will stop, and the economy will manage what might be called the second adjustment, resulting in resuming growth by mid-2025 (by around 2 percent in both 2025 and 2026) without encountering any recession in between. After 2026 the most crucial factor will be the dilemma between war and peace, so no further forecasts can be called reasonable. For the overall conclusion from all the three lectures, I would argue that in a competitive market economy the shift to the “war economy” can be managed without a dramatic decline in living standards and that such a turn, over the course of two to five years, may not produce devastating effects causing what I use to call “growth without development.” Therefore, any purely economic means of pressuring Putin’s regime to discontinue its aggressive war against Ukraine cannot be considered successful: the outcome of the war might be decided only on the battlefield.

The Fate of Ukraine and Future of the International Order

Dr. Andreas UMLAND

There are, first, the peacefulness of Ukraine before 2014, in contrast to countries like Iraq or Serbia when they were attacked; second, Russia's open territorial annexations in 2014/22 rather than creation of mere protectorates; third, the increasing signs of genocide in connection, for instance, with the mass deportation of Ukrainian children; fourth, the blocking of the UN by Russia through its permanent seat in the Security Council; and, fifth, the subversion of the logic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The result of the war is a subversion of the principle of national sovereignty, the UN system, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with particular explosiveness for states without weapons of mass destruction and/or US security guarantees.

The Ukrainian Far Right in the Post-Soviet Period

Dr. Andreas UMLAND

In spite of the high presence of the far right in media reporting about Ukraine, its actual role in Ukrainian politics is low. Especially, party-political ultra-nationalism has, in electoral terms, been unusually weak in post-Soviet Ukraine, if compared to other both East and West European countries. The Freedom Party, Right Sector, and National Corps have also remained politically marginal after the Euromaidan Revolution of 2013-2014. However, at the same time, far-right uncivil society – partly tied to the ultra-nationalist political parties, partly not – has gained strength and acceptance in the Ukrainian public, under the conditions of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine.

The Ukraine War as a Late Colonial and Post-colonial Conflict

Dr. Anatol LIEVEN

The USSR is frequently described as a kind of empire, and “de-colonizing Russian studies” has become the latest fashion in academia. This lecture will make a more historically and intellectually rigorous effort to place the fall of the USSR and the genesis of the Ukraine War in the wider context of the fall of empires and their aftermaths.

Military Lessons of the Ukraine War

Dr. Anatol LIEVEN

Like the First and Second World Wars, the course of the Ukraine War has frequently surprised the experts and overturned their prior analyses. On land, the most important lessons have been the greatly increased power of the defensive, the obsolescence of the tank, and the vital role of troop numbers. The most striking lesson of all – and the most worrying for the US – has, however, been at sea.

Ideology and the Ukraine War

Dr. Anatol LIEVEN

Western analysis of the genesis of the Ukraine War has been bedevilled by “parsimonious” (read simplistic or propagandist) attempts to identify one explanation for the war, and exclude all the others. In fact, numerous factors and motives combined to lead Ukrainians to break their historic ties to Russia, and Russia to respond with military force (as well as, of course, Western policy). On the Russian side, these included considerations of security; of historic territorial claims; of commitment to ethnic Russians outside Russia; of great power status; and of a form of “Pan-Slavic” national identity. On the Ukrainian side, a desire to escape the Soviet legacy and a partly mythologized view of “Europe” fused with or was taken over by Ukrainian ethnic chauvinism to produce a Ukrainian identity that could only define itself against Russia.

The war in Ukraine and Russian regions

Dr. Nikolay PETROV

The war in Ukraine has both direct and indirect effects on Russian regions. The purchase of cannon fodder and the sharp increase in funding for the military-industrial complex contributed to an increase in the level of well-being in previously depressed regions, and, as a result, a reduction in regional contrasts in living standards. The regions are responsible for both the formation and maintenance of contract military units and the restoration of sponsored administrative units of Ukraine. Front-line regions, such as the Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod regions, were directly affected by the war, which rather caused patriotic mobilization than contributed to the growth of anti-war sentiment.

Russia’s integration of occupied Ukrainian regions

Dr. Nikolay PETROV

Having moved from the role of a “roving bandit” to a “stationary bandit,” the Kremlin is investing colossal resources (approximately 1/8 of all war expenses) in the occupied Ukrainian regions. And this project is more successful for him than the military one. In this case, several goals are pursued: (1) creating an attractive image of “Russian Ukraine”; (2) transfer of the occupied territories to a regime of self-sufficiency; (3) infrastructure and logistics support for the front, etc. To achieve these goals, both the experience of the integration of Crimea in 2014-2024 and new approaches are used.

European Right-Wing Parties and the War in Ukraine

Prof. Reinhard HEINISCH

The Putin regime and Right-wing parties share important such attitudes and objectives as illiberal and nativist policies or the disregard for the rule of law.
The relationship between populist radical right parties and Russia has been well documented in the literature (Shekhovtsov, 2018). Recently, there have been increasing links between Russian actors and far-right activists and politicians in the West. Several populist far-right parties in Europe have also established formal links with Russia. They have parroted the Kremlin's arguments about its war in Ukraine. The same far-right actors portray the Ukrainian president as a corrupt warmonger, while Putin is seen as a shrewd defender of traditional values and national interests. This course will examine the radical right's position on Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine, first by trying to understand radical right-wing populism and then by looking at some specific cases of parties and their position on the war and its protagonists

Demography of Ukraine during the war and its post-war prospects

Dr. Mikhail MINAKOV

Ukraine is an example of radical changes in population structure and numbers in ahistorically short period of time. The loss of about 40 percent of the population and 20percent of the territory during the 11 war years created new — demographic and biopolitical— conditions for the continuation of defense during the war and the country's developmentin the postwar period. All forecasts of the development of Ukraine's political, economic, andsecurity situation will have to consider the new demographic reality. What are the structuresof this reality? How exactly will it influence post-war development? These questions will beanswered in the proposed report.

Party system and power networks in Ukraine during the war and their post-war perspectives

Dr. Mikhail MINAKOV

After Euromaidan and with the outbreak of the Donbas War, the Ukrainian party systemchanged several times. The Russian invasion of 2022 has minimized the internal politicalstruggle. Party organizations either disappeared or simplified to leadership groups for oneelectoral cycle. The rotation of power elites and the real political struggle is between newclans and patronage networks. The end of the ongoing war will nevertheless lead to theresumption of electoral cycles and the creation of new parties representing the publicsurface of the clans. Which parties might emerge? Who of their current politicians andmilitary officers can become political leaders? These questions will be answered in theproposed report.

Impact on and response of the EU (and Austria) to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine

Dr. Robert MÜLLER

As a result of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and ongoing political and hybrid activities from various actors, the overall security environment in and around Europe is currently undergoing a tectonic shift. What are the regional and global implications and how can the European Union and its member states (in particular Austria) best cope with these geopolitical challenges and defend a rules-based international order?

Recent and Current Discourse Patterns Regarding China’s Position in Russia’s War on Ukraine

Dr. Doris Vogl

Academic lecture on China’s position and discourse surrounding Russia’s war in Ukraine, analyzing official documents, diplomacy, and narrative patterns in US, EU, and global south perspectives.

China’s initial neutral/neutral-leaning stance following Russia’s invasion.
Review of the 2022 bilateral joint statement between Russia and China and its implications for China’s stance.
China’s 12-point position paper on the Ukraine crisis and its emphasis on sovereignty, de-escalation, and neutrality.

The outcome of the war in Ukraine – the security dimension

Dr. John Lough

His lectures will consider the consequences of the war for the security of Ukraine and Europe as a whole and whether there is a route to a sustainable peace. The war was a result in part of the assessment in the Kremlin that Ukraine could be rapidly defeated and forced to accept Russia’s peace terms because its western partners lacked both the capacity and the will to provide it with serious military support. In the event, the Russian army proved less competent than expected, the Ukrainian army more competent while the West turned out to be more resilient and determined than the Kremlin expected. What next? Peace, war, or something in between?